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Introduction 
Power without Glory signals a mundane, petty and ignoble understanding of power – that 
is, an understanding of power as ingrained in living and experiencing everyday life. 
Power, in other words, is ingrained in the way we talk, act and interact with each other. 
As a consequence language is at the center of analysis (Clegg, 1975; Silverman & Jones, 
1976; Fairclough, 2001; Boje, 2001). Language is not perceived as an objective 
representation of organizational reality; rather, language is seen as creating organizational 
realities. This is a fundamental assumption also in studies of language and discourse in 
organization studies today. Language or discourse studies are often linked to an 
ontological position of knowledge as being socially constructed. It is from this 
understanding of knowledge that the interest in Foucault’s conception of power has 
emerged in organization studies. It is commonly linked to a postmodernist position as a 
distinctive form of social constructivism (Darwin, Johnson & McAuley, 2002). This 
ontological position separates Foucault’s conception of power from other perspectives of 
power in organization theory at a number of different points. Hardy & Leiba-O’Sullyvan 
(1998, pp. 458-460) identify four points where Foucault’s conception of power is 
different. First, it challenges the presumption that power is something that individuals or 
groups of individuals have or possess. This is the presumption behind the other 
dimensions of power identified in Lukes’ (1974) seminal work. Power is rather a network 
of relations which captures the advantaged as well as the disadvantaged in its web. All 
individuals are subjected to power relations. Secondly, the assumption of a single 
autonomous individual is abandoned—instead, Foucault draws attention to how 
individuals are socially produced by the power relations surrounding them. In this 
respect, the individual is a socially constructed category of analysis with multiple 
fragmented identities. Thirdly, the status of the researcher is also challenged. Instead of 
viewing the researcher as all knowing and objective, he too is subjected to specific power 
relations, which influence his actions. Finally, power produces identity and values and 
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thus enables individuals with a sense of what it is to be worthy and competent. Power 
penetrates what individuals want. It penetrates what they are passionate about, what they 
intend to do, what they wish, what they like and dislike. Power penetrates values. One of 
the unique aspects of Foucault’s conception of power is its social constructivist 
orientation, which means that moral conceptions of truth and justice cannot be defined 
once and for all but always depend on time, place, and mind. Such conceptions are 
socially produced categories and cannot thereby be separated from actors, interests and 
intentions. It follows that the relation between power and knowledge is critically 
important in Foucault’s writings (e.g. Gordon, 1980). 
 
As such, the foundation for Foucault’s power analysis does not lie within theories of 
power but rather derives from the ontological position that reality is socially constructed 
– because in this universe knowledge cannot be separated from actors, intentions and 
interests. And within the social constructivist universe, language or discourse is the 
turning point. Therefore, these postmodernist writings are often positioned within the 
field known as Organizational Discourse (e.g. Grant, Hardy, Oswick & Putnam, 2004; 
Darwin, Johnson & McAuley, 2002). Language is thus absolutely central both in regard 
to Organizational Discourse in general but also in relation to Foucault’s power concept. 
Therefore, I will begin the discussion by turning to Wittgenstein’s philosophy 
(Wittgenstein, 1983) because this philosophy is more than anything concerned with the 
relationship between language and reality. Two principal books dominate his philosophy: 
Tractatus-Logico Philosophicus (Wittgenstein, 2001/1922) and the Philosophical 
Investigations (Wittgenstein, 1983). When people distinguish between an early 
Wittgenstein and a late Wittgenstein, it is because the two philosophies described in these 
two books are so radically different from each other (Hartnack, 1994; Husted, 2000). 
Tractatus-Logico Philosophicus (Tractatus) is a positivist philosophy concerned with 
establishing objective, universal and de-contextual truths. This conception is completely 
abandoned in the Philosophical Investigations (Investigations) where the attempt to 
establish universal and decontextual truth is viewed as a misunderstanding of how we use 
words. Instead truth is viewed as locally and contextually conditioned. At one point in 
this book, Wittgenstein speaks of recognizing the effects of language “…in despite of an 
urge to misunderstand them” (Wittgenstein, 1983, § 119). According to Wittgenstein 
some of the major philosophical problems stem from a misunderstanding of how 
language works, and thus how we ask questions about language. Instead of seeking 
universal and decontextual truths we simply have to ask for how words are used in their 
everyday settings. Therefore Wittgenstein claims that he doesn’t seek to solve 
philosophical problems – instead he wants them to disappear - by phrasing the question in 
a different manner (Husted, 2000). This sounds simple. The problem remains though that 
it is probably part of the Western rationalized way of speaking that questions are asked 
that seek to deduce universal and decontextual truths. It remains, in any case, still a 
dominating paradigm if not the dominating paradigm in science today. We need to 
recognize the effects of language despite the urge to misunderstand it. It lies deeply 
within us to ask questions that seek to deduce the universal truth of phenomena. A related 
point is that the difference between Wittgenstein’s early philosophy and his later 
philosophy has been interpreted as the failure of positivism (Clegg, 1975, p. 5), precisely 
because positivism seeks universal and decontextual truths. On the other hand, the 
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Investigations claims that “words” work and this work must always be understood 
contextually. In this particular context Wittgenstein uses the term “everyday life”. Instead 
of transforming language, we have to delve into it and explore it through how it is used in 
everyday life (see Clegg, 1975, pp. 6-7). 
 
The implications here in terms of understanding organizational phenomena are of course 
far reaching. Every event and every action has to be understood in its specific contextual 
setting. One of the central concepts, language games (see next section), becomes in this 
respect a concept that describes knowing in a broad sense. It denotes a way of doing, 
speaking, thinking, and being. As such knowing is fused with the concept of identity. 
Further knowing has to be understood as a social and contextual phenomenon where 
ways of doing, speaking, thinking and being are regulated and modified by rules such as 
norms, standards, procedures and so on. As mentioned before, this is why power analysis 
becomes critically important because knowing and being are locally and contextually 
conditioned – as are conceptions of truth and justice. Actors, intentions, and interests are, 
in other words embedded and embodied in the production and definition of truth and 
justice. This chapter identifies two aspects of power that are critically important in 
organization analysis. The first aspect of power is the relation between language and the 
author and has to do with the kind of truth and justice that are produced by organizational 
authors and writers. The second aspect of power relates to the focus of investigation: the 
relationship between language and the actors. This second aspect has to do with the 
positions, intentions and interests that different actors hold in the language games and 
how these influence what organizations hold as true and just. I will explore the links 
between power and language in the remainder of this chapter. This includes first an 
account of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy; second, why and how power analysis 
becomes critically important in organizational analysis; third, the role of organizational 
research is discussed given the theoretical premises identified. 
 
Language games 
As mentioned above, Tractatus is characterized by the attempt to produce a universally 
true language about reality. The presumption here is that every word and sentence has a 
clear and definitive meaning independent of time and place. Sentences refer to reality—
language should represent this reality (Clegg, 1975, p. 3). The Investigations begins with 
a critique of such a perception – namely the perception that language is a name-giving 
enterprise (Wittgenstein, 1983, §§ 1-3). According to Wittgenstein, this perception of 
language is a very primitive one (1983, § 2) and it doesn’t describe everything that we 
call language in the system. Therefore, the description is correct only within a very 
narrow and circumscribed region. The Investigations takes a diverse position, namely that 
the meaning of words is how words are used. This suggests that words change meaning in 
relation to the context in which they are used – they do not only have one meaning.  
 
”I set the brake by connecting up rod and lever.”- Yes given the whole of the 
rest of the mechanism. Only in conjunction with that is it a brake-lever, and 
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separated from its support it is not even a lever, it may be anything or 
nothing” (Wittgenstein, 1983, § 6). 
 
Accordingly, words have multiple meanings depending on the context in which they are 
used.  
 The concept of language games is introduced by Wittgenstein to emphasize this kind of 
interplay between language and social context. The concept does not only comprise 
linguistic dimensions. Language games perceives of language as a wider phenomenon, 
which comprises both language and the actions into which language is woven. 
 
”We can also think of the whole process of using words in (2) as one of those 
games by means of which children learn their native language. I will call 
these games “language-games” and will sometimes speak of a primitive 
language as a language-game...I shall also call the whole, consisting of 
language and the actions into which it is woven, the ”language-game” 
(Wittgenstein, 1983, § 7). 
 
Language is not an isolated phenomenon but must be seen as part of a whole situation, 
which is located in specific historical circumstances and in which there are other actors 
and physical artifacts. The meaning of language depends on how language is used under 
these specific conditions. “What is supposed to show what they signify, if not the kind of 
use they have”, asks Wittgenstein (1983, § 10). This is what is meant by saying that word 
works. This work is the meaning of the words. Words become meaningless when they are 
isolated in script or in print, because “…their application is not presented to us clearly” 
(Wittgenstein, 1983, § 11). In other paragraphs Wittgenstein compares the meaning of 
words with the analogy of looking into the cabin of a locomotive. There are handles, 
which look more or less the same but mean different things. One is the handle of a crank. 
Another one is the handle of a valve (1983, § 12). The point is that words do not only 
have one meaning and that there is no one single characteristic that characterizes one 
word. According to Wittgenstein, it is not impossible to try to obtain one common 
definition of a specific word. For example, all tools modify something or every word in 
language signifies something. The significant point in these examples is however that 
nothing is gained by such an expression. We have said nothing whatsoever according to 
Wittgenstein. It is not of much use to us (Wittgenstein, 1983, §§ 13-14).  
 
As such language will always represent reality only incompletely and imprecisely. It is 
not possible precisely to specify knowledge in language.  
 
”Compare knowing and saying: 
 how many feet high Mont Blanc is- 
 how the word “game” is used- 
 how a clarinet sounds. 
If you are surprised that one can know something and not be able to say it, 
you are perhaps thinking of a case like the first. Certainly not of one like the 
third” (Wittgenstein, 1983, § 78). 
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For this reason, Wittgenstein’s later philosophy has been compared with the writings of 
Polanyi (for example see Hall, 1979) and his central idea that “…We can know more than 
we can tell” (Polanyi, 1966, p. 4). Polanyi – like Wittgenstein – also emphasizes the use 
of that which he refers to as the explicit dimension – language. According to Polanyi, this 
means that knowledge is always tacit or rooted in tacit knowledge.  
 
“All knowledge falls into one of these two classes: it is either tacit or rooted 
in tacit knowledge. The ideal of a strictly explicit knowledge is indeed self-
contradictory; deprived of their tacit coefficients, all spoken words, all 
formulae, all maps and graphs, are strictly meaningless.” (Polanyi, 1969, p. 
195) 
 
Thus, language gets its meaning through how it is understood and applied. As a 
consequence, knowledge becomes an active process of doing, speaking, and thinking. 
Knowledge consists of two dimensions: a discursive and a non-discursive dimension 
(Gustavsson, 2001, p. 109). More precisely knowledge is the relation between the 
discursive and the non-discursive dimension. The concept language games – language 
and the activities in which language is woven - consists of a discursive and a non-
discursive dimension. It is important that the discursive and the non-discursive are always 
viewed in relation to each other. Viewed in isolation the two dimensions become 
meaningless. The discursive without the non-discursive is simply empty words. This is 
obvious when words are seen isolated in script or in print without seeing their application 
clearly (see Wittgenstein’s example above). Polanyi (1966, p. 18) mentions another 
example: Try to focus attention on the sound of a spoken word and not on its meaning—
soon the word becomes nothing more than a meaningless sound (see also Hall, 1979, p. 
275).  
 
To talk about the non-discursive without the discursive is equally impossible. We lack the 
concepts and words with which we can communicate and make reality meaningful for 
each other and ourselves. It is by means of language that we can describe, analyse and 
understand. Thus, the comparison with Polanyi’s concept of tacit knowledge should not 
be understood as indicating that language is unimportant. On the contrary, it becomes 
much more important. In Wittgenstein’s later philosophy language is presented as playing 
an active part in constructing reality (e.g. Harré & Gillett, 1994, p. 21). In contrast the 
early Wittgenstein perceived language as a passive or objective picture of the world. The 
comparison between Wittgenstein and Polanyi is brought into the discussion here because 
Polanyi – similar to Wittgenstein – believes that the meaning of language is the 
application of language. This application follows rules, which are tacit, taken-for-granted 
and embedded in everyday life (Hardy & Clegg, 1996, p. 634). Polanyi uses the term tacit 
knowing to emphasize that what we see, recognize and do is the result of an integration 
of elements of which we have knowledge we cannot tell (1966, p. 6). Knowing to use 
words, tools and do particular things always depends on this tacit integration of elements. 
The meaning of the discursive, in other words, always depends on something that is non-
discursive. Rules should be considered in this tacit way – as something learned and 
interiorized or internalized (Polanyi, 1966, p. 17) and used to accomplish and create 
particular things. The concept of rules is, in other words, ingrained in the very application 
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of language. Rules are tacit norms, traditions, standards, procedures, practices and so on 
but even if they are tacit, they are essential for the understanding and speaking of 
language. As such language is much more than just knowledge. Speaking and using 
language is about living and about being. The term “language-game” means “….that the 
speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life” (Wittgenstein, 1983, § 
23). To speak a language is thus to be able to participate in a life form and use language 
to correct, reprimand, invite, report, describe, reflect, analyse, persuade, emphasise and 
so on (Harré & Gillett, 1994, p. 21; Hartnack, 1994, pp. 72-73). To learn a language is to 
learn how to use it, not just to speak it. This means to learn how to use language for 
obeying a rule, making a report, giving an order, playing a game of chess and so on. To 
understand the use of language is to understand customs, practices, uses, institutions and 
so on - “To understand a language means to be master of a technique” (Wittgenstein, 
1983, § 199). Life form is linked to the presence of a standard – a custom, practice, 
tradition – which implies that people can be expected to behave in certain ways instead of 
others (Clegg, 1975, pp. 34-35). A language game is part of a tradition and is integrated 
with all other aspects of life including emotions, feelings and concrete activities. Thus, 
the discursive should not be overestimated. The discursive is woven with a great number 
of activities and is tied to a physical world (Favrholdt, 2003, p. 4). Language is part of an 
activity or a form of life, but the discursive alone does not define the life form. In reality 
there are lots of different kinds of knowledge, which are not discursive – at least not to a 
very high degree – but which are embodied knowledge. Polanyi calls this part 
“knowledge which is tacit” which is different from “knowledge, which is rooted in tacit 
knowledge” (Polanyi, 1969, p. 195). To mention a few examples, it includes basic and 
automatized movements like walking and running but also techniques such as skiing, the 
application of tools and complex knowledge, which are embodied in, to take just one 
example, the difficult operations of the surgeon (Flyvbjerg, 2001¸ see also Dreyfus and 
Dreyfus, 1986). 
  
Inspired by Hall’s descriptions of the relationship between tacit and explicit knowledge 
(Hall, 1979, p. 272), the discursive and the non-discursive may be perceived as 
dialectically related to each other. They both require and change each other but at the 
same time they mutually exclude each other. This suggests that knowing is always under 
development. Language always changes in the interaction with reality at the same time as 
language itself changes reality. To use Wittgenstein’s own words, language could be 
compared with an ancient city:  
 
“Our language can be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and 
squares, of old and new houses, and of houses with additions from various 
periods; and this surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs with straight 
regular streets and uniform houses” (Wittgenstein, 1983, p. 8). 
 
Thus, language is not something fixed once and for all. And paragraphs and words do not 
have only one function. There are countless different kinds of use. Further, new types of 
language or new language games continuously come into existence. Others become 
obsolete and are forgotten. As such knowing and language are always under continuous 
change. But this change is always conditioned on what came before and thus of the 
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contextual rules-of-the-game. As such tradition and change go hand in hand. They are not 
opposed to each other.  
 
Now, having clarifying that words have countless kinds of use and that the meaning of 
words cannot be defined once and for all, the question becomes: what makes it possible 
to classify, for example, language as language. Wittgenstein’s answer is that there is no 
single common essence that characterizes language. It follows that nothing general can be 
said that characterizes language games or life forms. 
 
“And this is true.- Instead of producing something common to all that we call 
language, I am saying that these phenomena have no one thing in common 
which makes us use the same word for all, - but that they are related to one 
another in many different ways. And it is because of this relationship, or these 
relationships, that we call them all language” (Wittgenstein, 1983, § 65). 
 
The phenomena called language have no one thing in common but languages are related 
to one another in many different ways. To explain these relationships, Wittgenstein 
introduces the concept family resemblance. Languages look alike - similar to the way 
members of a family look alike—“…build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, 
etc. etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same way. – And I shall say: “games” form a 
family” (Wittgenstein, 1983, § 67). Thus the phenomena called language is not called 
language simply because they share one common characteristic that unites them. They 
are called language because they look like each other just as brothers and sisters look 
alike in terms of looks, temperament and so on. Still, they are different from each other. It 
is, however, not possible to draw the boundaries between languages. This is possible in 
relation to a specific purpose but not in relation to all purposes. But does this mean that 
language is useless? If, asks Wittgenstein, “I tell someone “stand roughly there” – may 
not this explanation work perfectly” (Wittgenstein, 1983, §88). The answer is that of 
course it may work perfectly. The important question is whether information is 
understood or misunderstood. The usability of language does not require that the 
meaning of language must be defined once and for all.  
 
As a consequence, communication is not characterized by providing definitions of what 
the meaning is of particular phenomena. This cannot be done. Communication is like 
explaining to a person what a game is. It is not possible to define or express that common 
thing that characterizes the game. Instead, communication and understanding is achieved 
by means of examples. 
 
”And this is just how one might explain to someone what a game is. One 
gives examples and intends them to be taken in a particular way. – I do not, 
however, mean by this that he is supposed to see in those examples that 
common thing which I – for some reason – was unable to express, but that he 
is now to employ those examples in a particular way. Here giving examples is 
not an indirect means of explaining – in default of a better. For any general 
definition can be misunderstood too. The point is that this is how we play the 
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game. (I mean the language-game with the word game)”. (Wittgenstein, 1983, 
§ 71) 
 
Such communication is not something that is done in default of a better. If 
communication were to express exact and common characteristics, the problem would 
still remain that this communication could be misunderstood. The point is that is how the 
game is played. Communication is a game played by means of examples, descriptions, 
analogies and comparisons. Meaning is inherent in these descriptions. It is not necessary 
to specify knowledge precisely in words. 
 
”What does it mean to know what a game is? What does it mean, to know it 
and not be able to say it? Is this knowledge somehow equivalent to an 
unformulated definition? So that if it were formulated I should be able to 
recognize it as the expression of my knowledge? Isn’t my knowledge, my 
concept of a game, completely expressed in the explanations that I could 
give? That is in my describing examples of various kinds of game; showing 
how all sorts of other games can be constructed on the analogy of these; 
saying that I should scarcely include this or this among games; and so on.” 
(Wittgenstein, 1983, § 75). 
 
As such the concept of language games does not just mean giving up the idea that it is 
possible to give a complete representation of the one thing in common. It means simply 
that we have to give up the very idea that this should even constitute an ideal for 
philosophical investigations. I will return to this question in the next section. 
 
Understanding 
The new philosophy described in the Investigations is perceived as a milestone in 
philosophical thinking. Hartnack argues that the thoughts in this seminal book mark a 
new beginning; it is not a continuance or a development of others’ thoughts but a creation 
of something new (1994, p. 69). Harré & Gillett call it “…a new and different strand of 
psychology” (1994, p. 18). They argue that the second cognitive revolution derived most 
of its inspiration from the later writings of Wittgenstein. Thus, Wittgenstein’s later 
philosophy has quite radical implications for research practice. One of these implications 
is the apparently simple statement that instead of trying to correct language – that is try to 
deduce the essential and common truth in language – we need to understand language, 
something that locates the meaning of language in specific historical circumstances. But 
this difference is crucial for research practice and undermines the central premises of, for 
example, positivism, which seeks to deduce universal and essential truth. It is not just this 
point that is rejected by Wittgenstein - It is the whole idea behind it that is rejected - 
along with its theoretical building blocks, methods, and procedures. According to 
Wittgenstein, this is a super-order between super-concepts (Wittgenstein, 1983, § 97), 
which doesn’t even work as an ideal (1983, § 81). Because this could give the impression 
that such and such a language is better than other languages and this is by no means the 
case. Hence research is not supposed to deal with proof, truth, essence, but rather with the 
meaning of simple words such as chair, table, lamp and door (1983, § 97). It tries to 
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“…understand something that is already in plain view. For this is what we seem in some 
sense not to understand” (Wittgenstein, 1983, § 89). As such research is not about 
locating an invisible and mysterious essence among events but must be focussed on how 
language is used in everyday activities. Hence, everyday language is the later 
Wittgenstein’s main concern. It is everyday language on its own premises and not 
somebody else’s. This shift in focus might be difficult for the researcher to acknowledge. 
At one point, Wittgenstein asks: 
 
“Where does our investigation get its importance from, since it seems only to 
destroy everything interesting, that is, all that is great and important? …What 
we are destroying is nothing but houses of cards and we are clearing up the 
ground of language on which they stand” (Wittgenstein, 1983, § 118).  
 
People fail to be struck by the most important aspects of things because of their 
simplicity and familiarity (Wittgenstein, 1983, § 129). According to Wittgenstein, 
philosophical investigations have to be turned around. It is the only way of getting rid of 
the erroneous idea “...of crystalline purity” (Wittgenstein, 1983, § 108). In the same 
paragraph he notes that:  
 
“We are talking about the spatial and temporal phenomenon of language, not 
about some non-spatial, non-temporal phantasm.” (Wittgenstein, 1983, § 
108). 
 
Thus the discovery of the meaning of everyday life is coupled with the discovery of the 
meaning of time and place. The purpose of organization studies is to understand the 
language games played in the organization. The purpose is to understand the life forms of 
people inside organizations. This means that we must try to understand how people play 
language games in terms of framing, describing and solving problems within particular 
organizational contexts. In anthropology Thick Description (Geertz, 1973) is one example 
of a methodology that is inspired by Wittgenstein. The purpose of thick description is 
outlined by Geertz as follows.  
 
”…We are seeking in the widened sense of the term in which it encompasses 
much more than talk, to converse with them, a matter a great deal more 
difficult, and not only with strangers, than is commonly recognized” (1973, p. 
13).  
 
According to Geertz, researchers have understood people in a life form when the 
researchers are able to converse with them – that is, he argues that researchers must learn 
to use language according to the rules of the game in the specific context that is subject of 
investigation. It is questionable to what extent such empathy is possible (Von Wright, 
1995, pp. 20-21). But to some degree this is what researchers need to do – because it is 
the way that something different about reality may be learned, namely by getting to know 
people on their own premises. This means that a different character, form and 
organization of research are required. Methods are required by which researchers are able 
to “dig in”, “delve in” and explore everyday life (see Clegg, 1975, p. 7).  
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There are several different examples of such methods in organizational discourse. Grant, 
Hardy, Oswick & Putnam categorize these examples in two groups: language-in-use and 
context-sensitive approaches. Language-in-use approaches “…seek to provide a detailed 
examination of talk and texts as instances of social practice (Grant, Hardy, Oswick & 
Putnam, 2004, p. 9).” These approaches focus on talk in interaction and “…place 
emphasis on capturing and analysing discourse as a discrete moment that occurs in the 
present” (Grant, Hardy, Oswick & Putnam, 2004, p. 9). Such studies are as such 
extremely micro-oriented in their scope and seem to focus on the interaction in single 
events (Grant, Hardy, Oswick & Putnam, 2004, p. 10). As such, language-in-use 
approaches may be accused of being not all that context sensitive. In any case the 
conception of context seems to be very narrow because the discrete event is the focus of 
analysis – and not the relation to other events in both time and space. As such they may 
not be able to sufficiently capture the forces and thus the tacit rules of language games 
because the event is not approached properly as an historical event. The emphasis on 
historical and social factors that go beyond the text under scrutiny is what characterizes 
context-sensitive approaches (Grant, Hardy, Oswick & Putnam, 2004, p. 10). One 
example mentioned is critical discourse analysis, which analyses events from a three-
dimensional framework of analysis: a text dimension, a discursive practice dimension and 
a social practice dimension (Grant, Hardy, Oswick and Putnam, 2004, p. 11). As such 
critical discourse analysis combines a language-in-use approach with a more context-
sensitive approach. The approach described and adopted in this book is what I call a 
context-sensitive-approach. From a Foucauldian framework outlined in the next chapter, 
events are seen as historical events, while the study focuses less on the social interaction 
within discrete events. This implies a methodological weakness in the sense that language 
games are not approached in action, whereby direct access to how social construction 
takes place - in talk and action – is denied. Direct access would require for example tape 
or video recordings of conversations, meetings, seminars etc. Instead these events are 
approached only indirectly – by means of minutes, reports and interviews. The idea 
behind seeing events as historical events is among others to try to capture the inherent 
forces, contradictions, paradoxes as well as the different positions, interests, and 
intentions involved when people speak. As such there are innumerable forces at play in 
language games and therefore a sufficient understanding of them can only be obtained 
through a scrutiny of the specific historical and contextual conditions in which they take 
place. People use rules to play language games. These rules are tacit and taken-for-
granted and have the character of traditions, norms, uses and so on. These rules are 
historically and contextually created and embedded in the language user’s ordinary use of 
language. It is only through scrutinizing the specific conditions, therefore, that a sense 
can be obtained of what values and subsequently what feelings, beliefs and attitudes are 
linked to particular phenomena. It is through history and traditions that one learns to 
value certain phenomena. For example, to understand the game of chess is not equivalent 
to understanding the formal rules of chess, which prescribe that the chess pieces can be 
moved in this or that manner. To understand the game of chess is also to understand its 
history, tradition, narratives, stories and so on. The same insight applies to organizations. 
It is through history and tradition that one begins to understand the feelings of hatred, 
love, passion, fear, insecurity, motivation and enthusiasm that are linked to particular 
 12
events in organizations. These forces are also what give life to new phenomena in 
organizations. New phenomena, such as new organization and management concepts, 
have to be understood locally through how they are practiced in specific historical and 
geographical contexts (Czarniawska & Joerges, 1998; Sevon, 1998).  
 
Such historical forces are hard to explain, define or deduce from organizational 
phenomena in a positivist sense. This means that instead of trying to explain the 
emergence of particular phenomena, they must be understood through descriptions of the 
conditions in which phenomena emerge – organization studies must rely on descriptions. 
 
“Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language: It can in 
the end only describe it.... It (philosophy) leaves everything as it is. (1983, § 
124)......Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains 
nor deduces anything. – Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to 
explain. For what is hidden, for example, is of no interest to us” (1983, § 
126). 
 
When Wittgenstein argues that we leave everything as it is, he suggests that we rely on 
descriptions of language games. In this connection we must remember that in 
Wittgenstein’s terminology, descriptions are full of meaning and life. “To leave 
everything as it is” is to try to approach everyday language on its own terms. Language is 
not given a general foundation independent of the specific conditions in organizations. 
Instead research in organizations relies on descriptions of how language is used in these 
specific conditions. As such organization studies seek to understand phenomena that are 
already in plain view. They are concerned with humble problems, which may often seem 
very natural, mundane, dull, even boring and insignificant. This includes an exploration 
of that which we take for granted. This is similar to the science of the concrete 
(Flyvbjerg, 1991a) in that it is concerned with small problems: Why are social situations 
organized the way they are? How did it come into being? What arguments are at play? 
From where do these arguments originate? In organizational terms such questions might 
be: Why did they make this decision instead of another and how did they do it? Why did 
they pick this strategy instead of another and how did they implement it. Why did people 
react in this way instead of another and what consequences did these reactions have? 
When such activities are understood, we “know” the organization. The organization is 
understood through descriptions of how it works; in words and actions.  
 
Accordingly, organization studies need to be descriptive rather than explanatory. A 
descriptive science doesn’t pretend to explain why an organizational reality is as it is. It 
relies on descriptions and examples of how a particular organization works. It can 
describe what takes place. It can describe what went before these events took place. It can 
describe who and/or what is involved. It can describe the arguments and methods that 
people apply in the course of everyday communication. It can describe the conditions in 
which events take place. Finally it can describe the effects of what took place. By means 
of these descriptions it is possible to provide a meaningful account of the situation. Such 
descriptions are not themselves totally accurate or exact but, nevertheless, they are fully 
applicable. One must stress here that it is impossible to provide a fully accurate account. 
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All that is available to us is what can be seen, heard, and sensed—that which is available 
in the public domain (see Geertz, 1973; Cook & Yanow, 1996; Weick & Westley, 1996). 
This is only part of how knowledge is created. The inner mental and bodily processes, 
which convert this public knowledge into something else, are tacit. In the end, knowledge 
is only available through descriptions of how it works. It is in this sense that philosophy 
simply places everything before us in order to allow language games to speak for 
themselves. The researcher uses his or her language (in the form of theory or concepts) to 
describe these language games, but this language is not necessarily better than any other 
language. It is merely an object of comparison: 
 
“Our clear and simple language-games are not preparatory studies for a future 
regularization of language – as it were first approximations, ignoring friction 
and air-resistance. The language-games are rather set up as objects of 
comparison, which are meant to throw light on the facts of our language by 
way not only of similarities, but also of dissimilarities...........For we can avoid 
ineptness or emptiness in our assertions only by presenting the model as what 
it is, as an object of comparison – as, so to speak, a measuring-rod; not as a 
preconceived idea to which reality must correspond” (Wittgenstein, 1983, §§ 
130-131). 
 
Research uses its own language and concepts to structure and describe what takes place 
in local contexts. This construction of meaning is not identical with someone else’s. That 
is impossible. The purpose of description is to ”capture” something, which cannot be 
defined, namely meaning. Descriptions, therefore, are only objects of comparison. These 
may result in other people gaining new perspectives on reality. The criterion is not that 
research should mirror reality. This is quite simply not possible. The criterion is however 
that research provides valid, reasonable and comprehensible descriptions of contexts, 
where researchers and the audience (including the subjects of investigation) may be able 
to meet in a dialog, conversation and reflection on the forces inherent in these contexts 
because a common ground has been established between them. The medium for this 
learning is the language of the author. By discursively reorganizing the empirical 
material, the audience may gain different perspectives on reality. Again, this 
representation is a social construction in the same way that the object of research is the 
set of social constructions, which take place through language games in the particular 
organization in question (Astley, 1985). 
 
Power 
Representations are social constructions of reality. This observation is the link between 
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and Foucault’s conception of power. As a consequence of 
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, power becomes a central problem in social and 
organizational studies. Language can never be a complete representation of reality. It is 
an incomplete representation, which relies on understanding. Through language, different 
realities are communicated. The descriptions represent the participants’ lifeworlds and 
must be understood as part of traditions, uses and practices. The concept of language 
games implies that there is no independently objective and de-contextualised truth or 
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justice. What is considered true and just are locally conditioned constructions dependant 
on time, place and mind (TwoTrees in Boje, 2001, pp. 5-6). Beliefs and moral 
conceptions are constructed through language games. To understand language games is 
therefore to understand how these construct reality and define problems, solutions and 
interpretations of events. 
 
It follows that the values ingrained in everyday life cannot be separated from actors’ 
intentions and interests. As observed by Lyotard (1984) and Foucault (In Gordon (ed.), 
1980), power and knowledge are never independent—they condition each other. There is 
no knowledge without power and there is no power without knowledge. The contours of 
these power analytics are more fully described in Chapter 3—in this section, some 
aspects of power at a more general level are introduced.  
 
There are at least two aspects of power both of which are critically important. The first 
aspect of power is the relation between language and the author. Part of this aspect 
relates to the writing of organization. It is the author who writes about organization. The 
author thereby has an important position in relation to the construction of knowledge 
of/about organizations. The choice of genre influences the way that organization is 
written. Hence, it affects knowledge, which is an effect of writing (Rhodes, 2001). 
Writing organization is a construction in the same way that actors in organization 
construct their realities. The author is not independent of history but is, on the contrary, a 
part of history. The production of truth in science is, in other words, also a social 
construction (Astley, 1985). Its products are linguistic categories in more or less 
systematic forms. It follows that organizational realities and organizational research exist 
in a dialectical relationship to each other (Astley, 1985, p. 506). Organizational research 
also has its battles, disputes and negotiations of theoretical and professional positions in 
the same way as organizations have their battles, disputes and negotiations between 
different conceptions of reality. In recent years different genre techniques and different 
ways of documenting research have emerged in the form of storytelling (Gabriel, 2000), 
narration (Czarniawska, 1999. Boje, 2001) or writing (Rhodes, 2001). Each genre has its 
own way of documenting and constructing knowledge for an audience. 
 
While the author constructs language and knowledge, the author is also constructed by 
language. It also works the other way around, as Wittgenstein argues:  
 
”A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside of it, for it lay in our 
language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably.” (Wittgenstein, 
1983, § 115). 
 
Researchers and authors are part of the specific traditions with which they engage – 
through the process of research and writing – and in a continuous dialog.  
 
”One engages a tradition in dialog when one writes because one writes as a 
moment in an ever-changing stream of consciousness greater than one’s self, 
so that whatever matter one writes about is in one sense less important than 
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the veil of silence one must inevitably preserve about the tradition, a silence 
which enables one to write that in the first place” (Clegg, 1975, p. 12).  
 
Just as our language games make it possible to understand and describe things, we are 
also bounded by language games and, further, these language games influence the way 
reality is described and interpreted. The position of the researcher is therefore a critical 
question because the position conditions research results (Prichard, Jones & Stablein, 
2004, pp. 215-217). As such the position affects the researchers’ constructions of reality 
(Foucault, 1984b). This position resides in a body that requires space, sustenance, an 
income, effort, economic and intellectual resources.  
 
“Important aspects would include the opportunities to develop and train in the 
skills required to write theses that will be accepted, the opportunities to 
publish, and regional and disciplinary differences in intellectual tradition and 
organizational practices.” (Prichard, Jones & Stablein, 2004, p. 215).  
 
It follows that “Objective research” is simply not possible. There are at least two aspects 
to this problem. The first aspect is very traditional and covers the fact that science – as 
mentioned above - is a social construction. It covers the phenomenon that some language 
games of science construct reality without being able to actually communicate with the 
objects of science in the wider sense of the word (see Geertz, 1973, in relation to this 
point) and without obtaining a reasonable interpretation of this reality (see Weick & Daft, 
1983, pp. 74-76, in relation to this point). The other aspect of this problem is that the 
author may misunderstand the language games and interpret them as if they were part of 
her own language game. While the first is an abuse, the second is a misunderstanding. In 
both cases the central question is how to move from data to interpretation. And in both 
cases, Foucault’s solution is his special way of organizing history. This is mirrored in his 
methods of archaeology and genealogy (discussed in detail in Chapter 3). This bottom-up 
analysis of power is one special way of moving from data to interpretation. It is also an 
attempt to go beyond the power of language – that is, the author’s presumptions, beliefs 
and values. The intention is to allow the author to learn something new about reality. It is 
an attempt to allow reality to speak for itself on its own conditions instead of speaking on 
the author’s conditions. This attempt is, of course, never completely successful. But the 
key point is not that authors and researchers should be able to liberate themselves from 
language – nobody would want to do that anyway – but that they are capable of opening 
themselves towards reality. 
 
The second aspect of power relates to the focus of investigation: the relationship between 
power and knowledge in organizations. Certain language games are stronger than others. 
“To speak is to fight” (Lyotard, 1984, p. 10). There are, however, differences in the force 
with which people speak. It is power in the sense that some people are capable of 
defining the conditions for others—as Czarniawska (1997, p. 14) put it; “They decide on 
our jobs, where we should live, our identities”. But even if power defines the conditions 
for speech, it doesn’t define speech itself—“We are still co-authors of history…” 
(Czarniawska, 1997, p. 14). Power is, therefore, not an institutional iron cage in Weber’s 
sense (See Chapter 3). People always have alternatives at their disposal. Power is not the 
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difference between those who have it and those who do not have it (Hardy & Clegg, 
1996, p. 632). Power is about defining the conditions, the positions and the validity basis 
of speech. It is about defining the force with which different people speak. This is a social 
constructive perception of power. “…in every conversation a positioning takes place, 
which is accepted, rejected or improved upon by the partners in the conversation 
(Czarniawska, 1997, p. 14).  
 
It follows that meaning and identity are shaped through processes of negotiation. Further, 
the people participating in the negotiation have different possibilities of affecting the 
eventual outcome. People have different positions and possibilities for influencing what 
is true and what is just. Wenger (1998) speaks of ownership-of-meaning, which refers to 
the position of actors in terms of “…make use, affect, control, modify, or in general 
assert as ours the meanings that we can negotiate” (Wenger, 1998, p. 200). According to 
Wenger this negotiation of meaning takes place in communities of practice, which differ 
in terms of importance and influence. These communities are economies-of-meaning 
(Wenger, 1998, pp. 197-201). Thus, to speak of power in connection with language 
games is to speak of different positions and different positionings of moral perceptions 
and beliefs. This positioning is fluid. When applied to organization studies, these should 
not be conceptualized in terms of fixed roles and fixed truths (Harré & Gillett, 1994).  
 
“Language games” is a profoundly brilliant and useful concept here as it incorporates the 
notion of moves, countermoves, tactics and thus positioning—just like a game. 
Tryggestad (1995) draws on Von Clausewitz, the seminal theorist of war, in much the 
same manner. Tryggestad argues that Von Clausewitz was concerned with the inner 
relations of war, and not what the war should be. His theory about war is that it is an 
uncertain and unpredictable project subjected to the vagaries of wind, weather, the 
landscapes, bad luck, unpredictable countermoves, food supply, weaponry, cavalry, men 
and other materials (Tryggestad, 1995, pp. 5-6). Accordingly, the best strategy is the 
ability to improvise under changing conditions. It is not the ability to stick rigidly to 
plans. War here is perceived as a complex social process as distinct from a repetitive 
machine (Tryggestad, 1995, p. 6). Wittgenstein’s “language games” resemble Von 
Clausewitz’ notion of war in many ways. Language games are under constant change and 
this change defines different conditions for the next moves. The game or rather the games 
do not take place at one place but take place in many different scenes or sets. Another 
useful comparison in this respect is Tamara, which is Los Angeles’ longest running play 
(described in Boje, 2001). This play takes place on many different scenes and sets. It has 
actors, who come and go, and even the audience is rolled in and out and follow the stage 
acts in different scenes. It is a story, which never ends. The actors are always chasing the 
story, which is written from many different places and perspectives. In the same sense 
language games are fragmentary, inconsistent, loosely coupled, paradoxical—and they 
never finish. They are stories—which never end (Kendall & Wickham, 1999). They are 
also stories in which the meaning always depends on what comes next (see Latour, 1996, 
p. 42). In other words, they are antenarrative stories (Boje, 2001). The story is never 
finished and always appears to be looking for its plot.  
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The need for power analysis 
In sum, power now becomes a central problem in the context of applying Wittgenstein’s 
later philosophy. It is a central problem in relation to the various disciplines of research 
practice: data collection, interpretation, and documentation (Prichard, Jones & Stablein, 
2004). Further, power is also a central problem in regard to the concrete operations of 
language games in organizations. In this book I explicitly use Foucault’s conception of 
power because power is Foucault’s explicit focus. This is in contrast to, for example, 
Wenger and Czarniawska, who work with a notion of power. Using Foucault’s power 
concept necessitates a critical analysis. Foucault’s concepts and methods are linked to the 
concepts of language games and life form. Seen in a Foucauldian perspective, language 
games are seen as techniques for the production of specific types of truth and justice. 
Power is simply embedded in everyday life. It is embedded in the rules of application, 
understanding and interpretation of language. Power is embedded in structures, cultures 
and technologies (Hardy & Clegg, 1996, p. 631). It is tacit and taken-for-granted. As 
Hardy and Clegg (1996, p. 634) put it: “Power will always be inscribed within contextual 
rules of the game”.  
 
To mention an example from the literature we may take Silverman and Jones’ study 
called Organizational Work (1976). They conceive of bureaucracy as a lay concept – that 
is, they look at how rules and procedures are applied and used by people in a 
bureaucracy. They are applied by bureaucrats to – among others – judge and evaluate 
applicants as either qualified or non-qualified. One of the points of Silverman & Jones’ 
study is that every organization has its rules, norms and procedures for moulding and 
shaping the attitudes, values, and actions of its members. Every organization also has its 
rules, norms and procedures for controlling everyday behaviour in the organization. The 
strength of Silverman & Jones’ work is that it describes how the organizational structure 
works in the everyday operations of the people in organizations. The organization is not a 
stable and “dead” structure. The structure works and lives through the actions of people 
in the organization. The study of Silverman & Jones is heavily inspired by the later 
Wittgenstein in the sense, that it is a study of the everyday use of words in organizations. 
More specifically it is a study of how the rules, standards, procedures, and routines of the 
organization are applied in the everyday life of organization members. Foucault’s 
conception of power is directly linked to such rules. Power is not outside or behind these 
rules. Power is embedded and embodied in the application of them. Foucault’s work, for 
example, demonstrates how professional discourses or language games construct and 
shape the object of their inquiry. One example is how doctors diagnose diseases. Patients 
thus become subordinated to the medical discourse, which consists of concepts, methods, 
techniques and so on. In this sense, power is directly linked to organization theory, since 
the concept of organization itself might be seen as a symptom of the rationalized society 
where more and more aspects of life become objects of professional and scientific 
knowledge. This point is crucial in the works of one of the major organizational theorists, 
Max Weber, who was interested in the connections between power, rationality and the 
modern organization. He described the bureaucracy as the ultimate rational form (Weber, 
1971). Further, the name of the first theory within organizational theory illustrates the 
point all too well, “Scientific Management” (Taylor, 1982). The ideas of both scientific 
management and the bureaucracy are the presence of a number of formal rules, standards, 
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and routines that serve as a guide and controller of organizational behaviour. But while 
Taylor is the engineer who is concerned with efficiency and quality, Weber is the critical 
sociologist, who is concerned with the position of the individual in a rationalized world. 
Thus, Weber had a concern for ethics in his writings. Foucault shares this concern for 
ethics, as we shall see later. 
 
One of the main purposes of Foucault’s writings is to show how individuals in the present 
are subordinated by particular discourses or language games in society and organizations. 
Modern society is, according to Foucault, especially dominated by relations of power, 
which are gathered under the heading, disciplinary power. And it is also disciplinary 
power, which has attracted most attention in organization studies. A well-known 
phenomenon in this respect is “the Panopticon,” which is described in Discipline and 
Punish (Foucault, 1979) and originally formulated by Jeremy Bentham. The Panopticon 
has attracted interest from many organizational scholars (see for example McKinlay & 
Starkey, 1998, p. 3; Clegg, 1998, p. 34). As McKinlay and Starkey (1998, p. 2) put it 
“…the Panopticon provides the image of the disciplinary society”. It is a metaphor or 
symbol of the disciplinary society and of disciplinary power. Disciplinary power is one of 
the dominating forms of power in modern society (Foucault, 1979; see also Clegg, 1998, 
p. 31). The link between disciplinary power and the modern organization is also 
straightforward. In Discipline and Punish the emergence of disciplinary power is traced 
back to a period from approximately 1750 up to the start of the nineteenth century. In 
Foucault’s book disciplinary power is contrasted with earlier forms of power through 
descriptions of two forms of punishment: the terrible execution of the regicide Damiens 
and a timetable, which, eighty years later, describes and structures in detail how prisoners 
live (see Foucault, 1979, pp. 3-6; see also the description in Burrell, 1998, p. 18). The 
latter is a manifestation of disciplinary power. These disciplinary techniques - including 
the Panopticon – were first applied in the prisons according to Foucault. From the prison, 
it spread to other parts of society:  
 
“Prisons resemble factories, schools, barracks, hospitals, which all resemble 
prisons” (Foucault, 1979, p. 83).  
 
Such disciplinary techniques and practices became an important element in the 
emergence of the modern capitalist organization. The techniques associated with 
disciplinary power are disciplinary practices of surveillance, which are “…micro-
techniques of power which inscribe and normalize not only individuals but also 
collective, organized bodies” (Clegg, 1989, p. 191). Surveillance includes phenomena 
such as routines, rules, procedures, control and supervision. It follows that disciplinary 
power is at the very heart of the modern organization as described by Weber (see for 
example Clegg, 1989, p. 191; Clegg, 1998, p. 34; Mckinlay & Starkey, 1998, p. 4; 
Burrell, 1998, pp. 25-26). Disciplinary practices resemble the techniques of the 
bureaucracy linked with the rational society (Weber, 1971). Further, the Panopticon has a 
certain resemblance to Taylor’s “Scientific Management” (Taylor, 1982; see also 
Mckinlay & Starkey, 1998, p. 4) - where he sought to develop the division of labor 
according to disciplinary techniques.  
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One of Foucault’s most important contributions to the field of organizational studies is 
that he demonstrates how such disciplinary techniques and practices become part of the 
most intimate aspects of our lives:  
 
”The real point is not that most of us do not live in carceral institutions and 
can therefore escape from their discipline but that, as individuals, we are 
incarcerated within an organizational world. Whilst we may not live in total 
institutions, the institutional organization of our lives is total. It is in this 
sense that Foucault’s comment “prisons resemble factories, schools, barracks, 
hospitals which all resemble prisons” has to be understood” (Burrell, 1998, p. 
25).  
 
Clegg compares Foucault’s approach with Marxism and points out that Marglin and 
Braverman adopt a much too narrow approach to disciplinary power in that they only 
concentrate on the factory (Clegg, 1998, p. 34). According to Clegg, Foucault’s power 
concept is different from Marxism in two ways. ”First, control via discipline first 
develops not in the factory but in various state institutions” (Clegg, 1998, p. 36)—the 
factory is, therefore, not the birthplace of the relations of production. ”Second, it is not a 
control functionally oriented to capitalist exploitation but to the creation of obedient 
bodies” (Clegg, 1998, p. 36)—power is, therefore, not external to the individual but is 
historical and culturally specific and internalised in people. Power is in feelings, 
aspirations, wishes, a sense of belonging and the obligations that come with it. Clegg 
believes that Foucault’s analysis is different from Marxism in a third way. Bio-power 
(Foucault, 1978) - control of sexuality and the body - adds a third aspect beyond both 
Marx and Weber (Clegg, 1998, p. 37). 
 
As such Foucault’s conception of power must be understood in a much broader sense 
than most theories of power in organization studies. Power is pervasive (Buchanan & 
Badham, 1999, p. 40) in the sense that is deeply embedded and embodied in the processes 
and operations of organizations. It is embedded in the rules that regulate and control how 
language games are played in organizations. These control and surveillance mechanisms 
vary from organization to organization. I will mention two examples from Mintzberg’s 
Structures in Five (Mintzberg, 1983), which, I believe, are critically important in today’s 
society. The first is the machine bureaucracy, which since the advent of industrialization 
has been and still is important today. The control mechanisms in this organization 
resemble those of disciplinary power in that the organization is guided by formal rules, 
routines, and procedures. The second is the professional bureaucracy, which I believe 
has become even more important in today’s society. The control mechanisms in the 
professional bureaucracy are induced through education where the rules, norms, and 
traditions of the profession are instilled in the professional. Through education the 
professional gains the right to speak seriously or to produce authoritative accounts – that 
is, accounts that are more qualified than the speech and actions of any man (Silverman & 
Jones, 1976).  
 
There is a need in organization theory to view these regulatory and coordinating 
mechanisms as power as more and more aspects of organizational life become objects of 
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professional and scientific knowledge—and as ever more aspects are subjected to 
surveillance and control. The right to speak seriously and to produce authoritative 
accounts is also a right to judge others. As such the ethical dimension is critically 
important. This also applies to the professional discipline called organizational change or 
change management. Thus, the notion of change will not be considered as fundamentally 
different from other organizational processes. As such, change is not in opposition to 
organization as if change was considered dynamic and organization as stable. I don’t 
work with this distinction. Instead change is not fundamentally different from any other 
organizational process. Change consists of language games, which work to construct, 
shape, and mould reality in particular ways, and which are founded in particular values. 
Increasingly, it has become a discipline carried out by professionals such as consultants, 
managers and other change agents. Thus, the name organizational change comprises a 
number of different language games. As such the discipline organizational change builds 
on concepts, methods, techniques, and procedures. It is often a very systematic discipline, 
which has its own norms for measuring, evaluating, and judging performance; in other 
words, it has its own mechanisms of surveillance. 
 
Business process reengineering (BPR), supply chain management (SCM), balanced 
scorecard, the learning organization, organizational learning, value management and so 
on are examples of such language games, which induce or enforce new norms, new 
traditions, new procedures and new regulations, which both managers and workers must 
obey and conform to, and which construct reality in a specific way. To view these 
language games through the lenses of power is to give to organization and management 
studies a political and critical twist by which such language games might be questioned 
from within.  
 
The need for power analysis is supported by a discussion in a recent ASQ 
(Administrative Science Quarterly) forum where the question is viewed in the context of 
the recent scandals in American business life - Enron, WorldCom, and Arthur Andersen 
(Bartunek, 2002, p. 422; Clegg, 2002, p. 428). It is argued in this discussion that the 
question of power gradually disappeared from organization studies from the mid to late 
twentieth century, probably due to the hegemonic influence of neo-positivism in US 
business schools. Hinings and Greenwood (2002, P. 411) argue that historically the 
existence of organizations was addressed at two levels; firstly, the consequences in terms 
of how organizations affect the pattern of privilege and disadvantage in society, and 
secondly, the consequences in terms of how privilege and disadvantage are distributed 
within organizations. They argue that the former question has practically disappeared 
from discussion in ASQ during recent decades. The latter has received only scant and 
cursory treatments. A primary reason for that is that organizational research has moved 
from the sociological departments to the business schools. The central question 
emanating from a business school “…leans more toward understanding how to 
understand and design efficient and effective organizations” (Hinings & Greenwood, 
2002, p. 413). This question however focuses less on the moral foundation of the 
operations of organizations, if at all. This is, however, a critical question in contemporary 
society, where organizations are central to the lives and lifeworlds of so many people. 
Stewart Clegg pushes the argument to its uncomfortable limits. Inspired by Bauman 
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(1989), he argues that from the question concerned with designing efficient and effective 
organizations, organization scholars might as well study the holocaust. From an 
efficiency perspective alone, the dispatch of millions of people to their deaths was an 
enormous organizational achievement, both in terms of constructing identities and in 
terms of constructing the technological solution (Clegg, 2002, p. 428). Organization 
studies, therefore, cannot rely solely on economic studies of efficiency and effectiveness. 
Rather, they should also serve as moral education dealing with the values and ethics of 
present day organizations. This is not simply due to the recent extreme scandals in 
corporate governance in the USA and elsewhere. Foucault’s power analysis should not 
only be applied because there is a presumption that an organization behaves amorally. 
Further, power analysis should not only be applied because power is necessarily 
unpleasant, humiliating or suppressive; nor because it is necessarily illegitimate. Finally 
power analysis should not only be applied in order to locate power and non-power at 
particular positions. It is not for these reasons that power analysis is necessary. In 
Foucauldian power analysis, the reasons are rather the opposite – that power is tacit, 
unreflected, and legitimate. Power is embedded in norms, in traditions, in usage, and in 
practices. It is necessary to speak of power, because it is institutionalised and legitimate 
but still carries with it an unequal distribution of goods, privileges, status, and positions. 
Due to this double-edged nature it thereby creates unequal possibilities for defining what 
is considered true and just. In terms of organizational change, the change activities give 
some people a voice, while others are silenced.  
 
In my view, Foucaudian power analysis has not become less relevant due to the large 
number of different change discourses that have emerged over the past few decades. 
Some of these discourses work with some of the most intimate aspects of life such as 
values, attitudes, and identities. They tell people not only what to do but also how people 
should be as persons. And the foundations for doing this are often very slim (see for 
example Jørgensen, 2004). For this reason, Foucault’s power analysis is absolutely 
relevant. It doesn’t offer an alternative in the form of suggesting specific guidelines for 
behaviour. It seeks instead to offer a foundation for reflecting on the present and thus it 
seeks go beyond the power of language in the present. The purpose of Foucauldian power 
analysis is thus to question the moral perceptions and beliefs embedded and embodied in 
the operation of language games (this is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3). The 
intention is not to take sides (Hardy & Clegg, 1996, p. 632), nor is it to expose some 
parties instead of others although my history and psycho-biography, as author, must 
necessarily have some impact. The purpose is to question the moral foundations linked to 
the distribution of goods, rights and obligations in organizations and societies. The means 
are quite simply to expose the concrete operations of power - how power works. 
Nietzsche’s influence on Foucault’s writings (Foucault, 1984a) should be perceived in 
this light, as Nietzsche dealt with morality as a historically constituted phenomenon 
(Nietzsche, 1992a, 1992b). 
 
The purpose of power analysis is to bring into discussion the tacit, the unconscious, and 
the taken-for-granted. Foucault seeks to contribute with an understanding of everyday life 
in this way. He wishes to explore and open up everyday life. He thereby seeks to question 
the foundations of everyday life which include various taken-for-granted phenomena—
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phenomena which may appear insignificant and unimportant but which are not 
necessarily so—as some of the examples presented later in this book attempt to show. 
The core idea is to open up everyday life in order to question it from within. 
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